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COMMENT
CAN A STATE REGULATE PRICES OF A PRIVATE
INDUSTRY?
A few months ago, the New York Court of Appeals held that
the legislature of New York could constitutionally regulate the
price of milk.1 The case was immediately appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, and with the possible exception
of the Minnesota Moratorium Case, no recent case has attracted
so much attention. Law writers, teachers, and practitioners
eagerly awaited the decision of our highest court, and specu-
lated as to what it would be. This interest was intensified by
the fact that the' validity of much of our "New Deal" legislation
depended upon the answer.2 Finally, on March 5, the court
rendered its verdict.3 The vote was five to four in favor of the
legislation.
Does this decision give to the law a new concept of price
fixing? Before attempting to answer this question, it is highly
important to note that the court expressly decides that the milk
industry is not a public calling.4 With this in mind, a brief
survey of the court's general attitude prior to this decision is
deemed appropriate.
I People v. Nebbia (1933), 262 N. Y. 259, 186 N. E. 694. In this case
the legislature, after finding there was an economic emergency in the
milk industry, created a temporary Milk Control Board which was author-
ized to fix minimum prices for milk. A failure to comply with the Board's
regulations was made a crime. Defendant violated such regulations,
was tried, and convicted. The upper court affirmed the conviction upon
the ground that the statute was a valid and reasonable exercise of the
police power for the protection of the public welfare and hence was due
process of law.
2While the recent Federal legislation involves many constitutional
questions, the price fixing provisions are among the most important.
8 Nebbia v. People of State of New York (1934), 54 Sup. Ct. Rep. 505.
4 It was generally thought that the industry might be declared one
affected with a public interest because of the emergency existing in the
milk industry. However, the emergency doctrine is not discussed at all.
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The case of Munn v. Illinois 5 is generally considered the land-
mark in constitutional law on the question of price fixing. In
that case, a statute fixing the maximum price for the storing
of grain was held constitutional because the business was a
public calling-that is, "affected with a public interest." The
court held that the grain elevators of Chicago were affected with
a public interest because of the virtual monopoly in the business.
Chief Justice Waite writing the majority opinion adopted the
test coined by Lord Hale6 in the latter part of the seventeenth
century, and the phrase "affected with a public interest" became
a part of our constitutional law. A few years later, two more
grain elevator cases came before the court and the same result
was reached. 7 One of these cases is gignificant in that legisla-
tive declaration was held sufficient to make the business one
affected with a public interest.8 The next case of importance
is German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis 9 in which it was
held that the business of fire insurance was of such a character
as to come within the "public interest" rule of the Munn case.
The test there adopted was twofold, namely, that of indispens-
able service and virtual monopoly. Then followed the case of
Wolfe Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,' 0 which held
that a statute attempting to fix wages paid by packers was in-
valid. However, the case dealt with wage fixing alone, and the
court left open the question as to whether the preparation of
food could be subjected to regulation as a utility. But the case
is important in that it overruled legislative declaration as a test
of a public calling." Moreover, the idea that an industry, other-
wise subject to various kinds of regulation, might, nevertheless,
not be subject to legislative price fixing, made its appearance
in this case.
It was at this point that the court began to assume a more
conservative attitude on the question of price fixing. The case
5 (1877), 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77.
6 The law of public callings was developed largely through the influence
of Lord Hale. See 3 Ind. L. Journal 384; Willis, Introduction to Anglo-
American Law, p. 123.
7 Brass v. North Dakota (1894), 153 U. S. 391, 38 L. Ed. 757; Budd v.
State of New York (1892), 143 U. S. 517, 36 L. Ed. 247.8 Brass v. North Dakota ibid.
9 (1914), 233 U. S. 389, 58 L. Ed. 1011.
1o (1923), 262 U. S. 522, 67 L. Ed. 1103.
11 See also Frost v. Ry. Comm. of Calif. (1926), 271 U. S. 583, 70
L. Ed. 1101.
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of Tyson v. Banton 12 indicates this inasmuch as the court held
that the theatre business was not sufficiently clothed with a
public interest to justify the regulation of prices for the resale
of tickets. The court emphasized the fact that no indispensable
service was rendered. Again the court declares that there is a
great deal of difference between regulation as to price and regula-
tion with respect to other features of the business. The next
year, the court in Rebnick v. McBride 13 held invalid a statute
regulating the rates of private employment agencies. Mr. Jus-
tice Sutherland speaking for the majority employs the same
reasoning he used in Tyson v. Banton and disposes of the case
in a short opinion.14 However, by way of obiter dictum, he
indicates that the legislature has no power to fix prices for food.
Next came the decision in Williams v. Standard Oil Co.,' 3 involv-
ing a statute authorizing a commission to fix the price'for gaso-
line. The statute was held unconstitutional, and Mr. Justice
Sutherland again speaking for the court seems to definitely
answer the question of price fixing when he says, "It is settled
by recent decisions of this court that a state legislature is with-
out constitutional power to fix prices at Which commodities
may be sold, services rendered, or property used, unless the
business or property involved is affected with a public interest."
The decision also signifies that the court has finally adopted a
definite test for a business affected with a public interest, namely,
that of virtual monopoly plus indispensable service.
With the court thus indicating a taboo on the matter of price
fixing, the decision in Stephenson v. Binford 16 rendered in 1932
came as a surprise to many. In this case, the court withheld
the validity of a Texas statute giving to a commission the power
to regulate private contract carriers, including the power to fix
minimum rates. The significant thing is the statement by the
court that it was unnecessary to determine whether the business
was affected with a public interest. But more amazing yet is
the fact that Mr. Justice Sutherland delivered the majority
12 (1927), 273 U. S. 418, 71 L. Ed. 718.
13 (1928), 277 U. S. 350, 72 L. Ed. 913.
14 It is interesting here to note that a statute providing for regulation
of employment agencies by means other than price control has been held
constitutional; See Brazer v. Michigan (1915), 241 U. S. 340, 60 L. Ed.
1034.
35 (1929), 278 U. S. 235, 73 L. Ed. 287.
16 (1932), 287 U. S. 251, 77 L. Ed. 288.
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opinion. In deciding that the fixing of minimum rates was
valid, he made no mention of the three previous decisions in
which he so steadfastly argued that price fixing of a purely
private business was not due process of law. His argument iv
simply this: the statute undoubtedly interferes with the freedom
of the parties to contract, but that freedom is always subject to
restraint whenever necessary for the safety and welfare of the
state. This manner of approach is certainly at variance with
that employed in the last three decisions. As heretofore pointed
out, the validity of the legislation in those cases depended alto-
gether upon whether the business was one affected with a public
interest, whereas in the Stephenson Case, the sole question was
whether the regulation was necessary to protect the general
welfare of the state. In view of the fact that a similar factual
situation was involved in the Stephenson Case, the only logical
deduction is that it overruled the former cases.17 At any rate,
it denoted a decided swing away from the public calling concept,
and it is the opinion of the writer that the decision is ample
authority for the result in the Milk Case, for in both cases the
same question is involved-that of price fixing in a private in-
dustry. However, it may be argued that the Stephenson Case
didn't directly overrule the older cases.' s If such a position is
tenable, then it seems clear that the Milk Case gives us some new
law directly overruling the dogma of the previous cases and
introduces an era of governmental regulation.
REASONING OF THE COURT IN THE MILK CASE
The majority opinion is written by Mr. Justice Roberts, who
indulges in some ingenious sophism in arriving at the result.
As heretofore mentioned, he states that the milk industry is not
a public utility. It is submitted that no one will seriously
quarrel with this conclusion in view of the fact that the industry
is not monopolistic in character. But he does not stop there.
He says although it is not a public calling it is nevertheless a
"business affected with a public interest." Since the two terms
are always thought of as being synonymous, what sort of logic
17 See 8 Ind. L. J. 552. Wherein it is pointed out that the only reason-
able deduction from the language of the court is that such regulations may
be imposed on a private business.
Is Mr. Justice Sutherland apparently would take this position since
he concurs in the dissenting opinion in the Milk Case.
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is this? The learned Justice has a unique answer. His reason-
ing is that the phrase as used in the famous case of Munn v.
Illinois meant nothing more than that the business was subject
to the exercise of police power and that any other meaning is a
misconception. But the persuasiveness of his argument is nega-
tived by the fact that the court has used this phrase for over
a half century to define a public calling. However, Justice
Roberts would have us believe that the decision meant simply
that if the business affected the public it could be subjected to
legislative price fixing. It is submitted that no exercise of the
police power is valid unless the business affects the public in
some manner, but price fixing as an exercise of the police power
according to the Munn case is only valid where a virtual
monopoly exists in the business. If the phrase meant no more
than he contends, no exercise of the police power would be valid
unless virtual monopoly existed in the business being regulated.
Roberts' answer to this is that Chief Justice Waite in writing
the opinion in the Munn case didn't adopt virtual monopoly as a
test. He suggests that Waite only meant it was a circumstance
to be considered in justifying governmental control. Certainly
this is at odds with the usual interpretation of Waite's language.
Later in the opinion, he says monopoly is not a test at all and
cites Brass v. North Dakota 9 as the authority for that proposi-
tion. The fallacy of this argument is that this case has been
overruled 20 and later cases have applied virtual monopoly as one
of the tests. 21 Mr. Justice McReynolds, writing the minority
opinion in the principal case points out the fallacy of the argu-
ment and says such an implication is at variance with what the
court has repeatedly held. That McReynolds has the better of
the argument can hardly be questioned.
Although Justice Roberts' interpretation of what was decided
in the Munn case may be open to question, it doesn't detract
from the rest of his reasoning, which clearly supports the result
reached. First of all, the court repudiates the unexplained idea
that price fixing and regulation of other kinds should be treated
in a different manner. Prior to the decision in the instant case,
the court, as we have seen, distinguished between the two types
of regulation, holding that if there existed a sufficient social
19 (1894), 153 U. S. 391, 38 L. Ed. 757.
20 Frost v. Ry. Comm. of Calif. (1926), 271 U. S. 583, 70 L. Ed. 1101.
21 See 3 Ind. L. J. 385; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis (1914), 233
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interest all sorts of industry might be subjected to rigid regula-
tions of various kinds; but if price fixing was attempted, it was
valid only in the field of public callings. Other burdens such as
the obligation to serve everybody, without discrimination and to
provide reasonable adequate facilities were also confined to pub-
lic callings or businesses affected with a public interest. The
following quotation from the opinion clearly shows that this
concept, at least so far as price fixing is concerned, has ceased
to be of any force:
"But if, as must be conceded, the industry is subject to regu-
lation in the public interest, what constitutional principal bars
the state from correcting existing maladjustments by legislation
touching prices? We think there is no such principle. The due
process clause makes no mention of sales or of prices any more
than it speaks of business or contracts or buildings or other
incidents of property."
The court then seeks to strengthen its position by citing in-
stances wherein price fixing of a purely private business has
been upheld. The first of these is the usury laws, and it is sub-
mitted that they are clearly in point, for those laws fix the price
at which money may be used. Then the court points out that
rate fixing in a private business is valid according to the rule
of Stephenson v. Binford. As previously indicated, that decision
alone is sufficient authority for this case. The court then con-
cludes with the thought that a state is free to adopt whatever
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public
welfare, and that price control like any other form of regula-
tion is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or
irrelevant to the policy of the legislature.
IS THE RESULT A RATIONAL ONE
The result of the decision at first blush appears to be a trifle
revolutionary, but upon careful analysis it seems a sane and prac-
tical one. As heretofore noticed, the court has invoked a differ-
ent rule in determining the constitutionality of regulations other
than price fixing. It has been content in those cases to deter-
mine whether the legislation was necessary to protect the safety,
health, or general welfare of the people. And it has sanctioned
regulations of that kind even though they deprived the owner
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of his property.2 2 Thus we must squarely face this question:
Is there any logical reason why price fixing should be afforded
extra protection? Would it not seem that an actual taking of
the property itself is of equal, if not greater severity than regu-
lation with regard to price? Clearly the answer should be in
the affirmative. Furthermore, the distinction is weakened by
the fact that no reason has ever been suggested as to why free-
dom of contract in the making of price should be afforded this
additional safeguard. Thus, as a matter of logic it would appear
that there is no basis for the distinction. Also from a historical
standpoint, there appears to be nothing odious about price fix-
ing. In early English history, price fixing was the rule not the
exception, and when the Constitution of the United States was
adopted, legislative price fixing was familiar in practically all
of the colonies. Moreover, assuming the more conservative rule
may have been desirable, it has outgrown its usefulness. The
strong dissents of Holmes, Stone, and Brandies in the other
cases indicate an outright dissatisfaction with the practical
aspects of the approach formerly used.2 3 So the court's frequent
change of opinion as to the test for a business affected with a
public interest is a strong argument against its practicability
as a criterion for the constitutionality of the legislation. The
U. S. 389, 58 L. Ed. 1011; Williams v. The Standard Oil Co. (1929), 278
U. S. 235, 73 L. Ed. 287.
22 Noble State Bank of Haskell (1911), 219 U. S. 104, 55 L. Ed. 112;
Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co. (1922), 260 U. S. 22, 67 L. Ed. 107; Reinman
v. Little Rock (1915), 237 U. S. 171, 59 L. Ed. 900. See also Freund
Police Power Chap. I.
23 In Tyson v. Banton, Holmes expresses his views in a clear cut manner
when he says: "the notion that a business is clothed with a public interest
and has been devoted to the public use is little more than a fiction intended
to beautify what is disagreeable to the sufferers." Stone's separate dissent
in the same case, is just as strong. He says: "The phrase business affected
with a public interest seems to me to be too vague and illusory to carry
us very far on the way to a solution. It tends in use to become only a
convenient expression for describing those businesses, regulation of which
has been permitted in the past. To say that only those businesses affected
with a public interest may be regulated is but another way of stating that
all those businesses which may be regulated are affected with a public
interest." And even Sutherland who so steadfastly applies the phrase
has this to say in Tyson v. Banton: "This phrase first used by Lord Hale
200 years ago, it is true, furnishes at best an indefinite standard, and
attempts to define it have resulted, generally, in producing little more
than paraphrasis, which themselves require elucidation."
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recent change in economic conditions is another momentous
factor to be considered as movements of this kind oftentimes
require new remedies. The conditions existing in the milk in-
dustry are an example of this change. Competitive bargaining
had ceased to be an efficient regulator, and this lack of self
regulation resulted in serious injury to both the producer and
consumer. 24 So when it appeared that price fixing was the only
adequate solution of the problem, the court, thrusting aside its
conservatism, balanced the social interests of the producers and
the people as a whole with those of the merchant and reached
what appears to be a very desirable result. The method of
approach employed by the court is highly commendable in that
it permits a pragmatic inquiry into the necessity in each par-
ticular case and removes a superfluous limitation. Or in other
words, the solution in each case involves nothing more than a
careful and realistic balancing of the social interests involved.
The decision removes a great deal of uncertainty as to the
price fixing provisions of the "New Deal" legislation and it is
the opinion of the writer that those provisions will not meet
with much difficulty if the court finds that price control is an
effective method of protecting the paramount social interests
involved. It will also be interesting to watch the effect of the
decision upon the law of public callings. Since this sort of con-
trol (price fixing) was formerly confined solely to the field of
public callings, is there any logical reason why other burdens
so far only borne by public callings, could not likewise be im-
posed on a private business?
CORBETT MCCLELLAN.
Indiana University Law School.
24 Stone has always contended that price control should be allowed
whenever competitive bargaining ceases to be an efficient regulator of
business. See his dissenting opinion in Tyson v. Banton.
